Introduction

S
ince the 1980s a continuing discussion has been taking place about what we mean by sustainable development, and the appropriate relationship of the promotion of sustainable development to the conservation of biological diversity. The need for a concept of sustainable development that offers an alternative to dominant development paradigms is apparent to almost all. In this context, the concept of sustainable development has been seen as critical to efforts to construct approaches to development that do a better job of meeting basic human needs, and that are more compatible with efforts to conserve the planet's biological diversity. To this end, Uhl et al. (1996) called for sustainability to become a "touchstone concept" in university teaching, research and operations. Indeed, enough scientists from diverse disciplines have responded to this need, and dedicated themselves to
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One arena in which the disagreements between advocates of improving the quality of life of the rural poor and advocates of conserving biodiversity have frequently arisen has been in the design, implementation, and evaluation of what have been variously labeled integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), community-based conservation (CBC), and community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). Here we use ICDP to refer to the lot of these efforts. ICDPs have been informed by a line of thinking that moved from seeing biodiversity conservation and sustainable development as two different, but potentially complimentary, goals (IUCN 1980) , to treating them as if they were largely overlapping goals, or even two ways of saying the same thing (IUCN 1991) . As a result, in the minds of many, they equated the management of ecosystems to satisfy human production requirements with the conservation of wild ecosystems based on their intrinsic value (Robinson 1993) . Unsurprisingly, they have often yielded results that are seen as inadequate from both conservation and development perspectives.
Within this general muddle, observers have identified several specific factors contributing to the disappointing performance of ICDPs. One is that their designers sometimes repeated the mistakes of the integrated rural development projects (IRDs) of the 1980s, and made them sufficiently complex as to challenge the ability of responsible institutions to implement them efficiently and transparently (e.g., Blustain 1982 Blustain , 1985 Brinkerhoff 1981; French et al. 1983; Painter 1985; Solem et al. 1985; Sommer et al. 1982) . Thus, conservation and development objectives often became entangled on the ground, leaving many participants confused and alienated. A second difficulty has been that ICDPs tended to assume that local communities with which they sought to work were more isolated, solidary, and homogenous than they actually were, and to assume that a level of consensus existed, or could be constructed, around basic resource access and management issues when this was not the case (Brockington 2004; Peterson et al. 2005) . In so doing, they ignored a substantial body of social science theory and empirical research showing that conventional notions of community obscure too many crucial complexities related to differences in wealth and power, the definition of resource endowments, and patterns of resource distribution for communities to be selected a priori as a basis for planning and implementing projects and programs (e.g., Lenin 1956; de Janvry 1981; Figueroa 1982 Figueroa , 1984 Stavenhagen 1968) . Drawing on this tradition, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) proposed an alternate perspective whereby conservation organizations develop alliances based on sound assessments of what institutions are characterized by complimentary skills and interests, and where authority, responsibility, and capacity to make land management decisions are located.
While disappointment with ICDPs has been widespread, some conservationists have felt that the largest proportion of failures have come in relation to achieving biodiversity conservation goals, while successes have been more likely to be linked to attaining socioeconomic objectives (Kellert et al. 2000) . Some have concluded that ICDPs inevitably place a higher priority on socioeconomic objectives, and that the pursuit of these automatically occurs at the expense of biodiversity conservation. An unfortunate response by some has been to conclude that the livelihood objectives of local people, however legitimate they may be, necessarily conflict with biodiversity conservation objectives. As a result, they have staked out a position based on placing critical areas under strict protection, defending them through improved law enforcement, and winning such local support as can be won through more, and better, environmental education (e.g., Oates 1999; Terborgh 1999 Terborgh , 2000 . As Wilshusen et al. (2002) and Brechin et al. (2002) point out, these proposals are fine as far as they go. Conserving the planet's biodiversity is a self-evidently important thing to do, and placing key areas under strict protection, improving law enforcement, and providing more and better environmental education, are all essential elements of doing that. But, if that is the extent of the discussion, we are presented with a false choice between conserving biodiversity, on the one hand, and engaging meaningfully with people that have legitimate interests in the areas we wish to protect, on the other. As a result, we avoid, or ignore, the crucial question of how we construct legitimate and enforceable arrangements that will protect biodiversity over the long term.
This lack of engagement has led some advocates of the interests of local people to a rejection in principle of conservation strategies that include placing areas off limits to human productive activity, arguing that the production strategies of local people have contributed to conserving biodiversity, and that this relationship between production and conservation both reflects and helps sustain local interest in conservation (e.g., Colchester 2000; Schwartzman et al. 2000) . Once again, the point is fine as far as it goes. The rights and interests of local people must be respected as part of any conservation strategy, and, in many contexts, local people have played essential roles in conserving biological diversity, through their production practices, and through political mobilization. However, for a variety of reasons, local production systems and grassroots political mobilization have not always been supportive of conserving biological diversity, and to suggest that they always are, runs the risk of turning poor rural people into caricatures that we use to play out Western fantasies about noble savages living in a state of nature (Redford and Sanderson 2000) . Turning statements of principle about the rights of local people into practice is a difficult task, and the critical issue is how conservation strategies are constructed and implemented (Colchester 2000 (Colchester : 1365 .
Rather than engaging with one another around a shared interest in developing a broadly based critique of, and alternative to, conventional thinking about development, many advocates of both lines of thinking have allowed the discussion to become increasingly polarized, at a time when constructing alliances among disparate actors, based on shared interests, has shown itself to be increasingly important in addressing complex conservation issues (Johns 2003) . This has had lamentable consequences, as the resulting polemics have distracted both sides from building strategies based on clear understandings of the forces that drive tenure insecurity, landlessness, and poverty, and constitute major threats to biodiversity. As Sanderson and Redford (2003:390) note, conservation and poverty alleviation in remote and fragile ecosystems could both benefit from a dedication to constructing partnerships that build on the strengths of each, and are respectful of the tradeoffs that must inevitably be made. Eliminating poverty and conserving biodiversity are two distinct objectives, but, in practice, the overlap between the two is sufficient to warrant continuing efforts to work together, despite the difficulties (Adams et al. 2004) . As Schwartzman and Zimmerman (2005) and Zimmerman et al. (2001) have pointed out in their discussions of the partnerships of the Kayapó people with Conservation International-Brazil and the Instituto Socioambiental, we can build effective partnerships that benefit local people and yield significant conservation results, when we choose to make the necessary effort.
Building a Partnership
One such effort involving the Capitanía de Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI) and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) has been functioning in the Bolivian Chaco since 1991 (Map). WCS is an international conservation organization recognized for its research on wildlife populations and ecology, and resulting contributions to the conservation of wilderness areas. CABI is an indigenous organization representing over 9000 Guaraní-speaking people living in 25 communities along the Parapetí River, immediately to the south of the Bañados de Isoso wetlands, in southeastern Bolivia. Because of their residence in the Isoso area, the people who make up CABI's membership are known as Isoceños or Isoceño-Guaraní.
The CABI-WCS partnership has focused on elaborating and implementing a land use strategy for the Bolivian Chaco, based on the objectives of conserving biological diversity and promoting sustainable resource use. While recognizing that these two objectives often exist in tension with one another, and that WCS and CABI do not assign the same relative weight to each, the two organizations agree that both are necessary elements of any strategy that seeks to improve the quality of human life. This shared understanding has not resolved the major issues that compose the developmentversus-conservation discussion. But, it has provided a basis for three important achievements: (1) constructing a lasting alliance based on explicit recognition of where their interests do, and do not, coincide; (2) working together to negotiate successfully with external threats to their shared interests; and (3) learning from one another, so that both parties have become stronger, and both understand that they are more effective working together in pursuit of their shared interests than either would be alone.
Thus, while the interests that oriented WCS's and CABI's respective approaches to conservation in the Chaco are different in fundamental respects (e.g., Winer 2001 Winer :19-23, 2003b , the two institutions defined a set of conservation issues around which they had shared, or overlapping, interests, while remaining respectful of the differences in their respective missions. Over time, each learned to draw on these differences as a source of strength for their shared program. Explicitly recognizing where their interests do, and do not, coincide, has contributed to a relationship of trust, upon which the two organizations have built an effective partnership, which has to its credit important accomplishments on behalf of conserving biological diversity, and defending and advancing the interests of indigenous people. South America's Gran Chaco covers about one million square kilometers in Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil, and is one of the continent's most extensive biogeographical regions. It is characterized by diverse ecosystems that include palm savannas and marshes, semiarid thorn forests, and open grasslands on sand dunes. The Gran Chaco includes the largest expanses of dry tropical forest in the Neotropics, a biome that is facing greater threats than the region's most tropical forests. It has been deeply affected by overgrazing by cattle and goats, and commercial hunting for the international pelt and skin trade. In many areas, land clearing and associated schemes to promote ranching and farming have resulted in the degradation of ecosystems on a scale that exceeds almost any other area of South America (Taber, Navarro, and Arribas. 1997; TNC et al. 2005; WCS 1997) .
Based on extensive field research in Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, WCS was concerned that Bolivia is the only country in the region that still contains large areas where Chacoan ecosystems and habitats remain largely intact. At the same time it recognized that the Bolivian Chaco faces significant threats, particularly from ranches and farms with production practices based on extensive land use, and reflecting the fact that many property owners have found it easier and cheaper to acquire additional land, rather than manage well the areas they already had. It is also a key area in Bolivia's efforts to develop its natural gas industry, which contains several exploration and exploitation concessions, and lies at a critical intersection in an expanding regional gas pipeline network that transports natural gas from fields in Bolivia and Argentina to urban markets in Brazil. Parallel to the gas pipeline network, and partially stimulated by the development of the natural gas industry, the Bolivian government, with international donor support, is also undertaking two major highway construction projects, which will make travel into the Chaco significantly faster and easier. The dramatic degradation that much of the Chaco outside of Bolivia has experienced, combined with the mounting threats to the remaining relatively undisturbed areas of the Bolivian Chaco, led WCS to view the establishment of a protected area as an essential step in building a regional conservation strategy (Taber, Navarro, and Arribas 1997; WCS 1997) .
The threats to biological diversity that are the basis for WCS's concern for the area are experienced by CABI as a threat to the livelihoods and lifeways of Isoceños. The expanding agricultural frontier, natural gas concessions, and highways encroach upon or have impacts on areas that have historically been important to Isoceños, influencing possibilities to develop production alternatives that would allow them to prosper economically while maintaining their identity as a people. Thus, CABI's general goal was to construct production options that would permit Isoceños to satisfy livelihood needs without having to abandon values and practices important to their identity as a people. This goal reflected two major concerns: (1) that economic growth be equitable, to allow Isoceños to improve their standard of living as a people, as opposed to a small number of individuals accumulating wealth; (2) that economic growth should not carry the high environmental costs-defined in terms of deforestation, soil degradation, and the destruction of habitat of key wildlife species-characteristic of the farming and ranching activities that dominate the rural economy of Santa Cruz.
Independently of WCS, CABI's leadership reached the conclusion that the establishment of a protected area would provide a legal basis for halting the expansion of the agricultural frontier, and provide a focal point for defining new production alternatives. For CABI, the objective of establishing a protected area was part of a broader strategy to secure and manage the area the Isoceños regard as their historical homeland, which also includes a territorial claim filed under Bolivia's 1996 agrarian reform law, and support for strengthening indigenous participation in municipal government. Within this vision, conserving biological diversity is important because it is a central element of the physical setting that Isoceños associate with their identity as a people.
Inital Accomplishments of the Partnership
Based on their distinct, but convergent, sets of interests in promoting conservation in the Bolivian Chaco, CABI and WCS began to work together in 1991. The key accomplishment of the initial collaboration was the establishment of the Kaa-Iya del Gran Chaco National Park and Integrated Management Area (KINP), in September 1995. CABI presented the proposal for the establishment of the park to the Government of Bolivia, while WCS provided CABI with the technical support to prepare the proposal, and assisted it in following the proposal's progress through the government's review process. Covering some 3.44 million hectares, KINP is the largest protected area in Bolivia, and contains the largest area of dry tropical forest under protection in the world. It is the only national park in the Americas established as the result of an initiative by a Native American People, and the only one where a Native American organization shares primary administrative responsibilities with the national government (Taber, Navarro, and Arribas 1997; WCS 1997: 1-4) .
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For CABI, establishment of the KINP was part of a larger strategy to consolidate the implementation of a regional land use strategy. Simultaneously with its efforts to establish the KINP, CABI played an active role in Bolivia's decentralization program and was a leading organization in Bolivia's indigenous peoples movement. A key element of Bolivia's decentralization program was the granting of additional authority and responsibility to municipal governments, and the creation of new channels to encourage local participation in electing and overseeing the work of municipal officials. The point of departure for this to happen was the passage of the Ley de Participación Popular (Ley No. 1551, the Popular Participation Law, or PPL), in 1994. Under the provisions of the PPL, in July 1994, CABI was recognized as the municipal authority of the Segunda Sección Municipal (Second Municipal Section) of Santa Cruz's Cordillera Province, the largest geographic unit administered by the municipal government of Charagua. CABI was the first indigenous organization in Bolivia to assume municipal government responsibilities.
In 1996, in part thanks to the leadership role played by CABI in Bolivia's indigenous movement, the Bolivian government enacted a new agrarian reform law (Ley 1715, the Ley del Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, commonly known as the Ley INRA), which, among other things, recognized indigenous territorial rights, as defined in International Labor Organization Convention 169, as a legal form of land tenure. Taking advantage of the new law, in early 1997, CABI presented a claim for a 1.9 million hectare Tierra Comunitaria de Orígen (TCO), the term used in the law to refer to indigenous territories. This area was subsequently immobilized by the Bolivian government, meaning that no land could be bought or sold until the titling issues raised by the claim were resolved. The process of surveying the area, and sorting through the documentation supporting conflicting claims began in 2000, which financial support from a landmark agreement signed between the sponsors of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline and the organizations representing indigenous peoples in the pipeline's area of influence (see below). The first of what will be eight titles was issued to CABI in September 2001, and a second in July 2003. Titling of the remaining area is proceeding based on an agreement signed between CABI and the Bolivian government. Together, the KINP and TCO constitute an area of approximately 5.3 million hectares, an area nearly the size of Costa Rica (Arellano 2003; Winer 2001 Winer , 2003a Winer , 2003b .
Since the establishment of the KINP the main focus of WCS's support for CABI has been to help the organization move beyond the political achievement of creating this vast area, and assume the technical and administrative challenges of managing it effectively. This effort has focused on four major areas: (1) strengthening CABI's in-house technical and administrative capacities; (2) conducting participatory wildlife population and ecology research, and defining appropriate wildlife management practices based on the results; (3) consolidating a land use planning and environmental monitoring program for the KINP and Isoceño TCO; and (4) designing and implementing a permanent environmental education program, which focuses on improving understanding of basic ecological concepts, and their application in the management of the KINP and Isoceño TCO (Winer 2003a (Winer , 2003b .
Building on this foundation, CABI and WCS have to their credit several important conservation accomplishments. Their partnership has established the largest and most systematic research program on wildlife population and ecology ever carried out in the Chaco. Even more significantly, the participatory research methods employed have contributed to the preparation of a team of Isoceño paraprofessionals who are capable of designing and implementing research activities to help them understand the environment in which they live, and presenting the results to scientists and professionals in national and international settings, rather than having that environment interpreted for them by others (Arambiza and Ayala 2000 Ayala , 2003 Barrientos and Cuél-lar 2003; Barrientos and Maffei 2000; Cuéllar et al. 2004; Guerrero and Arambiza 2004; Guerrero et al. 2002; Leaños and Cuéllar 2000; Martínez and Cuéllar 2003; Mendoza and Noss 2003; Parada and Guerrero 2000; Soria 2003; Soria and Noss 2000) .
CABI and WCS worked together to complete the management plan for the KINP (Proyecto Kaa-Iya 2001), which was commended by Bolivia's National Park Service (Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, or SERNAP) for being supported by a combination of scientific rigor and broad local participation in its drafting. The same approach used to prepare the zoning proposal that lies at the heart of the KINP management plan was subsequently used to prepare the zoning proposal for CABI's management of the Isoceño TCO, which extends the areas designated for conservation beyond the boundaries of the KINP. These newly defined conservation areas include most of the Bañados de Isoso wetlands, only about 15 percent of which are located inside the KINP, and the banks of the portion of the Parapetí River located inside the TCO, areas designated as a RAMSAR Site in September 2001, based on the information gathered by CABI and WCS for the preparation of the management plans for the KINP and Isoceño TCO.
CABI and WCS also designed and implemented a successful environmental education program as part of the curriculum of Isoceño schools. Begun in 1996, the program built on provisions of Bolivia's educational reform, which gives local people greater control over curriculum content. Based on extensive consultation with students, parents, and teachers, the program elaborated a core curriculum, along with supporting materials, which was implemented in all 16 Isoceño schools, with all 90 teachers, and a student population of over 2000. The program has focused on teaching students about how Isoceños came to live successfully in the Chacoan environment, and provided concepts for understanding the different management issues confronting Isoceños today, as the assume the challenges of managing the KINP and TCO. UNICEF has prepared a guide for implementing school-based environmental education based on the Isoceño experience, and, with assistance from CABI and WCS, district education officials have undertaken adapting the Isoceño materials so they might be used to design and implement a similar program for the entire Charagua school district (Winer 2001: 14-15, 38-39) . 
Longer Term Accomplishments
The lessons that CABI and WCS learned about one another, and about working on behalf of conservation and sustainable land use, enabled them to go beyond the initial definition of their shared interests, and influence areas in which, at the outset of their collaboration, neither institution would have had much impact. Examples of areas in which the influence of the partnership has extended beyond initial expectations include: (1) the design and implementation of programs to address environmental and socioeconomic impacts of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline, (2) the definition of new approaches for titling indigenous lands, and (3) establishing mechanisms to finance conservation.
The Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline
The partnership between CABI and WCS has helped both institutions deal with challenges arising from the rapid expansion of Bolivia's hydrocarbon industry, which began in the mid-1990s, and was marked by the construction of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline, which either passes through or immediately borders the KINP for 250 kilometers. With technical support from WCS, CABI led indigenous organizations in negotiating an agreement with the pipeline sponsors, signed in December 1997, which included groundbreaking provisions in structuring relations between local organizations and energy companies working in Bolivia.
The agreement was reached after a long negotiation, the advance of which was interrupted, in September 1997, when a Petrobras subcontractor illegally entered the KINP with heavy equipment accompanied by armed soldiers to begin clearing the pipeline right-of-way. The action was illegal because the subcontractor should have submitted a work plan to SERNAP for review by the national office and the KINP director. While they did not have the authority to stop work on an approved project, declared a national priority by the government, they did have the responsibility to place conditions on how the work should proceed, to ensure their ability to monitor it and minimize impacts on the park. Beyond its illegality, the action was specifically provocative in the context of the negotiations regarding the IPDP, a central element of which was the definition of a procedure for ensuring compliance with protected area regulations that provided for adequate review of construction activities. CABI responded by dispatching park guards who stopped the machinery and held it in place until the IPDP agreement was signed with the pipeline owner, GasTransBoliviano (GTB), in December 1997, and Petrobras signed a letter formally adhering to it, in February 1998. The program defined by the agreement included four major components: (1) organizational strengthening; (2) pilot production projects, to explore opportunities to construct new economic options, based on principles of sustainable resource utilization; (3) support for titling indigenous lands; and (4) support for the management of the KINP. The agreement also provided for the implementation of an environmental management program for the section of the pipeline right-of-way located within the KINP, to be implemented by CABI in its role as park co-administrator (Convenio Marco 1997) .
The total amount of money committed by the pipeline owner to the programs covered by the agreement was in excess of US $ 4 million, an unprecedented amount for an agreement between energy companies and indigenous organizations in Bolivia. More important than the amount of money involved, however, was the structure defined to implement the programs created by the agreement. Under the plan originally proposed by the pipeline sponsors, the programs would have been administered as if they were a conventional development project by a consulting firm hired for the purpose. The consulting firm would have been charged with completing all activities within the two-year time frame corresponding to the construction phase of the pipeline. CABI led the indigenous organizations in arguing successfully for a program run by an executive committee composed of three representatives of indigenous organizations, three members representing pipeline sponsors, and an independent member chosen by mutual agreement of both parties, and that this body should operate under an open-ended time frame to ensure that the various activities were implemented properly.
The innovative structure of the program contributed to three important features that had not previously been part of agreements between energy companies and indigenous organizations in Bolivia:
1. Indigenous organizations were involved in making critical decisions about the definition, funding, and implementation arrangements of programs, which reflected their priorities and their vision of changes they expected the development of the hydrocarbon industry to bring to their areas, and their acceptance of responsibility for the successes or failures associated with the programs. 2. Indigenous people took the lead in implementing or monitoring activities in which they otherwise would have been involved primarily as passive spectators. While there was wide variation in how well different tasks were carried out, and not all experiences were satisfactory, local people gained important skills in addressing technical issues associated with project implementation, and the program's administration made greater contributions than it otherwise would have to its organizational strengthening activities. 3. The implementing structure of the agreement created a forum where the representatives of the pipeline sponsors and the indigenous organizations worked together to find solutions to the kinds of concrete problems that are part of planning and implementing participatory programs. The mechanisms that arose from this experience were subsequently used by CABI and the pipeline sponsors to address other issues associated with the continuing expansion of the energy industry in the region.
As noted above, the agreement was groundbreaking in the sense that it was the first of its kind between indigenous organizations and energy companies in Bolivia, and it allowed CABI and the other indigenous organizations that participated in it to deal relatively successfully with the impacts of the pipeline project, and it was the point of departure for the land titling and conservation finance activities discussed below. In this context, it has received considerable international attention. For example, it was a major factor in the decision of the International Association of Impact Assessment to recognize the project for its programs to address the pipeline's socioeconomic and environmental impacts, and the World Bank has cited the project as an example of best practices in the same areas. Also, the agreement was a factor in CABI being awarded the XIII Bartolomé de las Casas Prize from the Spanish government, for tenacious and innovative defense of indigenous cultures and biological diversity, and other awards.
It remains unclear to what extent the agreement will influence how relationships between the sponsors of pipelines and other large infrastructure projects and local people will be organized in the futures. There have been several subsequent examples of companies saying that they were applying the principles of the agreement in programs to mitigate the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of other pipeline and infrastructure projects. However, the desire of the companies to "simplify" and "streamline" structures and procedures has tended to weaken or eliminate provisions that helped ensure equitable participation and shared responsibility for outcomes. For their part, other grassroots organizations and their advisors have found it difficult to maintain the same level of engagement with companies through the negotiation and implementation of complex agreements that CABI organized and led in the case of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline. This has reinforced the companies' tendencies to seek to simplify and streamline. So, to date, the application of this experience in other settings in Bolivia has been modest.
Titling Indigenous Lands
Of particular importance to CABI and the other indigenous organizations who were party to the agreement was a program providing US $1.5 million for the titling of indigenous lands in the pipeline's area of influence. CABI and WCS led the design of this program, the key element of which was to define a working relationship with the National Agrarian Reform Institute (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, or INRA) that would actually lead to titles being issued. This was important because, at the time, no indigenous organization had received title to its territorial claim, despite substantial investments in INRA for this purpose by the World Bank and DANIDA. Under the pipeline land titling program, the Ayoreode people were the first in Bolivia to receive TCO titles to approximately 273,000 hectares, in early 2000. The program also resulted in the titling of lands belonging to 43 Chiquitano communities. Titling of the Isoceño TCO is currently in progress, under the terms of an agreement signed between CABI and the Bolivian government, which established a rotating fund of $732,000, the balance of the funds from the pipeline agreement left after completing the Ayoreo and Chiqutano titling processes, to complete the titling of CABI's territorial claim. To date, 560,000 hectares have been titled as part of the Isoceño TCO, and over 165,000 hectares of land have been titled in favor of private ranchers with legally documented claims to land inside the TCO. The remaining area claimed by CABI is in different stages of the titling process; some areas have completed all of the technical requirements and are ready to be titled, while other areas are still undergoing document review and measurement. The legally prescribed steps for completing the process are continuing, although, because of the powerful interests affected by the titling of the claim, the government requires encouragement from time to time to ensure that the process continues to move ahead.
Land titling is also a critical conservation issue because it is impossible to encourage people to practice conservation or manage land sustainably if ownership or use rights are in question. Land has historically been cheap and abundant in the Bolivian lowlands, a situation that has encouraged farmers and ranchers to expand into new areas, rather than manage well areas already under production. This, combined with institutional weakness of INRA and other government agencies with land management responsibilities has meant that the process of establishing boundaries and securing titles often has not been transparent. This lack of transparency has, over time, contributed to bringing an end to the perception of cheap and abundant land. For example, in Santa Cruz's Chiquitos Province, 152 percent of the total land area is claimed by individual owners for agricultural use. To a greater or lesser degree, this situation is found throughout Santa Cruz Department. Unfortunately, the growing sense of scarcity has not created incentives for better land management. Instead, it has encouraged more deforestation and ill-conceived production practices, and intensified land conflicts, as would-be landowners attempt to demonstrate their utilization of an area and derive whatever benefits they can before their claims are challenged.
The CABI-WCS partnership has made important contributions to moving the land titling process forward. The first derives from CABI's approach itself, which included both a national park and an indigenous territory as the central elements in a regional land management strategy. This provided an important example that indigenous territorial demands and the conservation objectives of national parks can be mutually reinforcing, if the two sets of objectives are explicitly and transparently taken into account in the definition of the respective areas, and planning for how land is to be used. The case of CABI was singular in the sense that both the KINP and TCO were the products of the same grassroots initiative, and each was conceived with the other in mind. This contrasts with the more common situation, in which parks and indigenous territorial claims, as well as other land use claims, represent competing proposals.
Bolivia's agrarian reform law provides mechanisms for resolving conflicting land claims. But, its implementers have not been consistent in finding ways to involve all actors in the titling process, or in moving the process along at a reasonable cost. As a result, the implementation of the law has been slow and erratic, or simply stalled, in much of the country, and land conflicts have tended to fester and grow. Within the framework of the land titling program associated with the pipeline, CABI, with technical support from WCS, took the lead in designing an agreement that was signed between INRA and the committee administering the land titling program, with the participation of the indigenous peoples whose land was to be titled. The agreement defined responsibilities for supervising the technical teams involved in reviewing land claims and verifying boundaries, and procedures for consulting with all parties to resolve conflicts expeditiously, and established results benchmarks to be achieved as a condition for continuing disbursement of funds. This support for INRA, designed as a result of the WCS-CABI partnership, and provided by the land titling program, led to the results noted above, the first case in Bolivia of a TCO completing the titling process, the completion of the titling process by 43 Chiquitano communities, and the successful beginning of the titling of the Isoceño TCO. The approach defined under the agreement also served to reduce the costs of the titling process, from the $1.25 per hectare estimated by INRA at the outset of the program to between $0.36 and $0.40 per hectare, based on the actual costs of the titling program. Subsequently, CABI built on this experience to reach an additional agreement with INRA and the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning to define a program to complete the titling of the Isoceño TCO, including a mechanism for funding that portion of the titling process not covered by the pipeline titling program.
A third important contribution to land titling that arose from the CABI-WCS partnership was in the development of a participatory approach to land use zoning. This approach was initially employed in the preparation of the KINP management plan, and was later applied to the elaboration of a zoning proposal for the Isoceño TCO. In addition to contributing to the internal process of Iscoceños developing a shared vision of how they will manage their TCO, the approach has yielded other important benefits. One occurred early in the titling process, when the Viceministerio de Asuntos Indígenas y Pueblos Originarios (Viceministry of Indigenous Affairs and Native Peoples, subsequently elevated to ministry status) undertook a spatial needs assessment of CABI's territorial claim. A normal part of the titling process, the purpose of the assessment is to determine if the amount of land claimed by an indigenous organization is appropriate, based on a combination of land use and projected population growth. The results of this assessment go to INRA, which oversees the process of resolving conflicting land claims and preparing titles, in the form of a recommendation. However, the methodology for the spatial needs assessment was borrowed from a methodology developed in Peru to calculate the amount of land required for peasant production systems to reproduce themselves. Since one of the major purposes of claiming a TCO is to allow indigenous people to avoid becoming trapped in a setting where economic options are limited to managing a peasant production system, the methodology is not appropriate to the problem at hand, and it has tended to recommend the awarding of substantially smaller areas than those claimed by indigenous organizations. In the case of the Isoceño TCO, INRA accepted the zoning proposal prepared by CABI, with WCS technical support, over the recommendation of the spatial needs assessment, as being more scientifically grounded, and more consistent with the purpose of a TCO. This has subsequently made it easier for other indigenous organizations to justify their land claims based on similar approaches. For example, the Tacana people in northern La Paz department, whose organization also has a partnership with WCS, also successfully challenged the recommendation of the spatial needs assessment on the basis of a similarly prepared zoning proposal for their TCO.
A second contribution of the participatory approach to land use zoning has been in the resolution of land conflicts. For example, the initial reaction of private landowners in the TCO was to oppose the titling process, presenting it as a threat to their private property rights by indigenous people. However, using the GIS database developed in collaboration with WCS, CABI presented the landowners with a detailed map, which showed that almost all of the boundary disputes that would come to a head as part of the titling process were among the landowners themselves, and not between the landowners and CABI. This immediately changed the tone of the disagreement, and led most of the landowners with legitimate land claims to see that their options for securing credit and technical support, and developing new production options, would improve as a result of the TCO and their lands being titled and managed on the basis of a shared vision of land use capability. To date, CABI is the only indigenous organization in Bolivia to have negotiated agreements with the majority of property owners inside their TCO to support the titling process.
Conservation Finance
The agreement signed between indigenous organizations and the sponsors of the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline also provided for $1 million to capitalize a private trust fund to generate a permanent source of revenue for the KINP. WCS and CABI worked together to design the organizational structure of the Kaa-Iya Foundation, a Bolivia-based, non-profit organization, which will be the permanent owner of the trust fund. The founding members of the foundation's board of directors include a representative of the company that owns the pipeline, Gas TransBoliviano (GTB), a representative of CABI, and an independent member. Under this arrangement, GTB agrees to accept responsibility to help ensure that the KINP continues to be able to meet the challenges that may arise from future hydrocarbon development. The Kaa-Iya Foundation is using the $1 million from the agreement as seed money to attract additional revenues to support the park, and encourage investment in the surrounding area that is consistent with sustainable land use, and consistent with the conservation mission of the KINP, either as contributions to the trust fund's capital, or by offering the income the fund generates as matching funds to those raised by CABI, WCS and other sources. During 2002, WCS was able to generate $55,000 more than it would have otherwise to support conservation activities in and around the KINP. In 2004, WCS and GTB signed a joint funding agreement, under which each will match contributions of the other, up to $75,000 per year, in support of Kaa-Iya Foundation programs. Foundations and private corporations interested in conservation and sustainable development are currently discussing how this agreement might be used to provide counterpart funding to trigger their donations to the Kaa-Iya Foundation.
The Kaa-Iya Foundation is one manifestation of CABI's general commitment to raising the money to support KINP operations, including covering basic operating costs that should be provided by the Bolivian government under its coadministration agreement with CABI. During 1998-2000, for example, the Bolivian government experienced a crisis in its ability to cover the basic operating costs of the national park system. Drawing on interest generated by the trust fund and other sources, CABI raised more than $324,000, over half the KINP's basic operating budget, allowing the park to continue to function during the crisis and demonstrating the potential importance of Bolivia's coadministration mechanism for helping insure that national protected areas can withstand periods of government revenue shortfalls.
In each year since 2001, CABI has contributed between 30 and 35 percent of the KINP's total budget. That CABI has made this kind of commitment to the KINP is a clear indication of the central role that the protected area plays in its land management strategy, and the importance that it places on conserving biological diversity as an element in the quality of life that Isoceños seek to achieve for themselves.
Interest in Continuing Collaboration
The partnership of CABI and WCS invites a two-fold question. First, to what extent is WCS's perspective as an organization whose mission focuses exclusively on conserving biological diversity compatible with CABI's, an organization motivated equally exclusively by the protection and promotion of the welfare of its constituency? And second, what happens to the relationship when the limits to their overlapping interest are reached? The short answer is that concern for human welfare does not necessarily conflict with the desire to conserve biological diversity. CABI is not interested in occupying and utilizing the KINP, or dedicating the Isoceño TCO to farming and ranching. It is well to remember that the concept of TCO is rooted in the idea of defining a physical space within which indigenous people have the possibility of constructing an approach to development that is consistent with their sense of themselves as a people. The filing of a TCO claim is almost in its own right a declaration of a search for an alternate approach to development, based on a broad definition of quality of life that considers Isoceño culture and values. While the quality-of-life issues of primary concern to Isoceños are different in many respects from those of WCS conservationists, both institutions assert a value that how humans interact with the world around us is intimately linked to the kinds of people we are, and that the quality of our lives is not reducible to economic growth.
Building broadly based support for conservation depends on a critical mass of people from a variety of backgrounds identifying their own reasons for wanting to conserve, not on their adopting the values of WCS. How successful conservation is in a given context is an outcome of how compelling those reasons are found to be. In the case of CABI, the organization's commitment to the KINP has been demonstrated on various occasions, including its initiative to establish the KINP in the first place, its successful effort to raise money to keep the KINP functioning in the face of government funding shortfalls, and its defense of the KINP in the face of an illegal incursion by a contractor working on the Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline.
At the same time, CABI's interest in conservation arises from a desire to protect Isoceño lands and provide its constituency with livelihood alternatives that avoid the negative environmental and socioeconomic consequences associated with the ranching and farming models that have dominated rural development in the region, and, in doing so, respect and strengthen Isoceños' identity as a people. From this perspective, assertions about the intrinsic value of nature that do not include people as part of nature are both alien and alienating. CABI has been consistently clear that, while it welcomes all of the input that WCS cares to provide, decisions about how to manage the land under its administration are based on different priorities than those of WCS, and may not be the same as WCS would make, and that respect for its decisions by WCS is a condition for the continuation of the partnership.
WCS's position arises from its calculation of what local actors have interests that are most compatible with its own, and are most capable of advancing those interests, and not from an inherent interest in the struggles for the rights of indigenous people. While it recognizes the right of all local actors to participate in the process of defining how land in the region will be used, and constantly seeks to help broaden the alliance supporting conservation in the Chaco, it has also concluded that conservation is best served by CABI's larger struggle as an indigenous organization being successful. For its part, WCS has been consistently clear that this conclusion will be the object of a continuing critical assessment.
At the same time, it is clear to both that the achievements resulting from their collaboration have far outweighed the significance of the compromises that each party has made in promoting their respective visions and missions. Shared achievements have contributed to the trust that each has in the other, and the willingness of each to make the extra effort to find common ground, based on the awareness that each institution will achieve more in advancing its respective long-term objectives through continuing collaboration than by trying to work alone.
Conclusions Programmatic Lessons
The experience of CABI and WCS offers several lessons for building partnerships between conservation and indigenous organizations. The most obvious of these is that the partnership has been constructed with an explicit recognition of the differences in perspectives and interests of the two institutions. While WCS supports the efforts of indigenous organizations to secure justice for their constituencies, it is a conservation organization and its partnership with CABI is based on its assessment that supporting CABI's regional land management strategy offers the best hope for conserving the last large area of Chacoan wilderness in South America. For its part, CABI views environmental conservation as essential if its efforts to improve the quality of life of the Isoceños as a people are to be successful. There are, however, other essential elements related to access to health care and education, increases in available employment, and improvements in the conditions under which people who are employed work. Thus, its concerns are broader than WCS's, and the priority that it assigns conservation in a particular setting is sometimes different. Explicit recognition of this from the outset has made it easier for both organizations to remain true to their missions, and to deal with the disagreements that inevitably occur in a straightforward way that does not lead to either party feeling that its efforts are being undermined.
One outcome of the recognition of this difference in perspectives is that conservation is placed within a broader context of territorial planning. WCS does not take a leading role in assisting CABI to solve problems associated with the broader set of issues of concern to Isoceños. But, it does engage with CABI in considering how, and where, efforts to address this broader set of issues will be carried out, if the areas prioritized for conservation are to be protected successfully. An important aspect of this is recognizing the heterogeneity of the actors with interests tied to how land ownership and access in the area are defined. At one level, this is an obvious point, when one considers the divergent interest of municipal governments, private landowners, and Bolivian army, all of whom are present in the area, in addition to the Isoceños. Within these different groups, however, there are other differences, which are in many ways more significant in shaping the opportunities and obstacles for building a broadly based consensus about land management that includes the conservation of biological diversity. For example, the ranchers in the area vary widely in terms of their capital investment, and their patterns of land use reflect these differences. Some, who tend to be concentrated on the eastern side of the KINP have made relatively large capital investments in their properties, and have demonstrated more interest in improving management within their boundaries and less tendency to encroach on areas outside the boundaries of their properties than have their more capital-poor counterparts (Linzer 1998) . Similarly, there are important differences within the Isoceño communities themselves. For example, the 25 communities are characterized by five distinctly different approaches to production, in which the relative importance of wage labor, livestock, crop production, and wildlife utilization vary significantly (Benería-Surkin 1998). These differences underlie fundamental differences in views about land management issues ranging from their willingness to limit hunting offtakes to their commitment to implementing a regional land management strategy based on zoning for conservation and production (Proyecto Kaa-Iya 2001:36-52) . Working through these different levels of heterogeneity to construct a vision of land management supported by a critical mass of the population has been one of the greatest challenges to the Chaco program, and one of its most critical successes.
Finally, while partnerships need to be based on shared interests, the existence of these is not itself a sufficient base for building a strong working relationship. Partnerships arise out of the experience of carrying out activities together, overcoming disagreements in a way that contributes to building mutual trust, developing a shared vision, and coming to understand what is, in fact, shared, and what is not. CABI and WCS began to work together in 1991, and the relationship continues to require active engagement by both parties to keep it strong. This, combined with the fact that the biological, socioeconomic, and institutional objectives that compose sustainable conservation require substantial periods of time to achieve, means that the partnership is necessarily long-term. Specifically, it will require commitments that go well beyond the funding cycles and attention spans of most donors. Thus, while donor funds can play a critical role in moving processes forward, as USAID support has done in the case of CABI and WCS, the partnership cannot depend on donor funds. Institutions need to be prepared to commit significant amounts of their own resources, independently of the ebb and flow donor interest, and to invest significant effort in finding ways to build local sources of support for conservation. On the one hand, this requires the construction of the kind of vision of territorial management described above, which includes the participation of local governments, private landowners, and other actors, to define areas for investment that are secure. On the other, it requires exploring how to work with private investors whose primary interests are in other areas, but who may see promoting conservation and sustainable land use as supportive of their business objectives.
Lessons about Conservation and Sustainable Development
In recent years, building partnerships between conservation organizations and organizations representing indigenous people has suffered, as people concerned with the issues involved have dedicated more effort to buttressing rhetorical walls than to building bridges of understanding. Several factors linked to competing understandings of sustainability have contributed to this tendency. As noted in the introduction to this paper, sustainability continues to be afflicted with a series of conceptual lacunae, which have often made it more useful as a vehicle, or straw man, for promoting one's particular point of view, than as an analytical concept for sorting and setting priorities, or evaluating results.
Particularly damaging to efforts to strike an appropriate balance between promoting economic development and the conservation of biological diversity as keys to improving the quality of human life has been the conflation of sustainable development and biological conservation, treating them as is they were inherently compatible, or overlapping, concepts, or even as if they referred to the same thing. This led to the expenditure of significant amounts of money on integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), which were often designed and implemented on the basis of internally contradictory sets of assumptions and objectives, and achieved predictably unsatisfactory results, from both conservation and development perspectives. Furthermore, as project implementers sought to force incompatible activities together as part of a single package, the participatory approaches that give community-based efforts their name were often replaced by decidedly top-down management attempting to respond to agendas that had little to do with local realities (e.g., Goldman 2003) .
Unfortunately, recognition of these shortcomings has only infrequently led to sharper analysis of the relationship between conservation and development needs in particular settings, and consequent improvements in how we seek to strike the appropriate balance. Rather, the voices on both sides have become increasingly shrill in asserting the transcendent righteousness of their respective positions, and more insistent on placing their efforts in a context that excludes the other perspective. Conservationists have often rejected what they regard as utilitarian views of nature, and insist that the conservation of biological diversity be justified in terms of its intrinsic value (e.g., Oates 1999; Terborgh 1999) . Framed in this way, the range of things that one might do becomes increasingly narrow, with the focus ultimately narrowing to more and better environmental education, and more and better law enforcement, particularly as this relates to safeguarding the physical integrity of protected areas (e.g., Oates 1999: 244-248, B6; Terborgh 1999:199-200) . The implication of this approach is that, given adequate information and encouragement, most people will come to share the conservationists' perspective about the importance of conserving biological diversity, and that those who do not will be dealt with as a law enforcement problem. Thus, local people are seen as passive, uncritical recipients of education, or as a problem to be overcome, roles which leave little opportunity for meaningful participation in decision making.
Grassroots advocates, on the other hand, argue that active involvement in decision-making about land use is a moral right of the people who depend on that land for their livelihoods, and a key element for better, more sustainable conservation (e.g., Schwartzman et al. 2000) . In many cases, they present the people whose interests they seek to represent as natural conservationists, only slightly modified versions of noble savages, whose production aspirations have been, are, and will always be consistent with the goal of conserving biological diversity. In advancing this argument, they cease to be the advocates of the interests of real local people, and become the purveyors of an image of local people who do not exist in real time or space (Redford and Sanderson 2000) . This fundamentally distorts the diverse and complex situations that form the contexts of rural peoples struggles to improve the quality of their lives, and makes them responsible for the political viability of protected areas, a burden that they cannot shoulder alone (Chicchón 2000) .
The partnership between WCS and CABI is important because it shows the potential for working within a structure of alliances that build on the strengths that distinct actors bring to the process of promoting biodiversity conservation as part of a regional land use strategy that has improving the quality of life for humans as a central goal, and where the different parties involved are respectful of one another's reasons for being there. As Callicott and Mumford (1997: 35-36) propose, this allows two perspectives to co-exist and compliment one another. One values nature, and the biological diversity that composes it, for its own sake, and works to define and manage protected areas that do the best job possible of conserving biological diversity independently of human production goals. The other views nature as a hierarchically integrated set of ecosystems, with humans and their production systems forming an inescapable part. Both elements are essential to a landscape-level land use strategy that is sustainable, both in the sense of ensuring the conservation of biological diversity over time, and accommodating a dynamic vision of the needs and aspirations of local people.
The framework of a partnership, in which all parties participate actively and meaningfully, provides the setting in which the relationship of these two elements of the strategy can be discussed and negotiated transparently, and creates a context in which local organizations can elaborate a political strategy that builds on historical strengths, while exercising their options to incorporate new elements into their production systems. When the space exists for elaborating such a diversity of options, the conditions are most favorable for improving living conditions in a way that finds an acceptable relationship between conserving biological diversity and responding to human needs (e.g., McCabe 2003; Fratkin and Mearns 2003) .
Partnerships between conservation organizations and local people are one important element in the opening of such a space. But, they require dispensing with the mythology of natural conservationists, as a way of avoiding the tough decisions about allocating land for meeting human production needs and for conserving biological diversity. They also require recognizing that we all share an interest in ensuring that our land allocation decisions are wise ones, and seeing local people as partners in constructing the necessary wisdom, rather than as a problem to be dealt with through education and law enforcement. At the same time, the populations of local people with whom conservation organizations (and others) seek to work are not homogenous, but cross-cut by divisions of social class, gender, and ethnicity, among others, all of which influence their visions of how land should be used, and their interest in being partners. One key for conservation organizations is to assess well what sorts of institutional relationships will provide the linkages with those sectors of a population whose interests do overlap in a significant way with their own so that the resulting partnerships begin on a solid footing. A second key, once a partnership is formed, is to work with our partners, political authorities at different levels, and other actors to create settings in which visions regarding land use can be ventilated, and decisions regarding land allocation and use can be made in ways in which, while not necessarily satisfying everyone, are sufficiently transparent and broadly supported so that decisions, once made, are respected. In such a context, all parties can be forthcoming about how they define their interests, and what are their agendas for how an area should be used (or not). Conservationists, and others, may sometimes find that they are not entirely pleased with the decisions that are made. But, they will be sure that their point of view informed the decision-making process as part of a socially grounded, pluralistic approach, and maximized the chances that ethical contentment, social respect, and real-world results (Lélé and Norgaard 1996:363) are among the outcomes of their efforts.
Notes 1
Bolivia's 1.2 million hectare Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park also operates under a coadministration agreement between the country's National Park Service and the Subcentral del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional, an indigenous organization representing the people living in the area. However, it is a weaker organization, and does not assume the level of day-to-day responsibility for administrative and technical matters that CABI does.
2 In addition to developing materials, CABI and WCS provided intensive training to the teachers who would use them during the initial years of the program, and CABI continues to ensure that they receive periodic refresher courses. To date, resources have not been found to provide this training component to accompany the teaching materials being developed at the level of the school district.
3 Petrobras spokesmen hastened to inform the press that work on the pipeline project, vital to Bolivia's national interest, had been halted by indigenous people looking to pressure the companies into increasing the size of the socioeconomic compensation package being offered. They neglected to mention that the indigenous people in question were park guards, employed by the national protected area system, performing their duties in accordance with Bolivia's national environment law and regulations on the management of protected areas (CABI 1997; El Deber 1997a , 1997b , 1997c . Subsequently, representatives of GTB responsible for supervision of the construction of the pipeline confirmed to the authors that, based on the pipeline construction plan and timetable, there had been no reason for the subcontractor to enter the KINP at that time. The incident had been manufactured (1) to attempt to establish the precedent that the pipeline builders were not obligated treat protected areas differently from other state lands affected by the project and (2) create a confrontation that would undermine the negotiations between the pipeline sponsors and indigenous organizations regarding the IPDP.
Bolivia's national park system consists of 21 protected areas, covering approximately 16.7 million hectares, or approximately 15 percent of the national territory. At this writing four are managed under coadministration agreements with the Bolivian government.
